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JENKINS V ANDERSON: THE FIFTH AMENDMENT FAILS TO
PROTECT PREARREST SILENCE
INTRODUCTION

In Jenkins v. Anderson,' the United States Supreme Court allowed the
prosecution to impeach the credibility of a criminal defendant's testimony
based upon his prearrest silence. It is argued here that the Court's analysis
was unsatisfactory and that a vital fifth amendment right has been sacrificed
for greater prosecutorial proficiency.
Dennis Jenkins was charged with first-degree murder and tried in a
Michigan state court. The defendant's evidence showed that on August 12,
1974, the defendant's sister and her boyfriend were robbed by Doyle Redding and another man. The defendant, Dennis Jenkins, who was nearby,
followed the thieves to their destination and reported their whereabouts to
the police. The next day, the defendant stabbed and killed Redding. The
defendant did not immediately report the stabbing, but did turn himself in
2
to the authorities two weeks later.
At trial, Jenkins took the stand and, for the first time, related an exculpatory version of the event. He testified that on August 13, 1974, he encountered Redding, who accused him of informing the police of the robbery.
Then, according to the defendant, Redding attacked him with a knife, and
in the ensuing struggle Redding was killed. At trial, Jenkins at all times
3
maintained that he acted solely in self-defense.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant the following
questions over the objection of the defendant's counsel:
Q. And I suppose you waited for the police to tell them what
happened?
A. No, I didn't.

Q. Did you ever4 go to a Police Officer or to anyone else?
A.

No, I didn't.

The prosecutor again referred to Jenkins' prearrest silence in the closing
argument. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to
ten to fifteen years' imprisonment. 5
After exhausting his state remedies, Jenkins sought a writ of habeas
corpus in the federal district court. He contended that his constitutional
rights were violated by the prosecutor's questions relating to his prearrest
silence. The district court denied relief and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 6 The United States Supreme Court
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

447 U.S. 231 (1980).
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 234.
599 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1979).

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1

granted certiorari. 7 The Supreme Court held that the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility does not violate the fifth
or fourteenth amendments. 8
I.

SILENCE PROTECTED:

A

REVIEW OF PRE-JENKINS LAW

The use of a criminal defendant's silence at and before trial is not a new
issue.9 Numerous Supreme Court decisions have dealt with adverse comment by the prosecution on the defendant's silence at trial' ° and with the use
of post-arrest silence to impeach the credibility of a testifying criminal
defendant. 1
A.

Adverse Comment

Since the 1965 case of Grin v. Caiforn'a,'2 the fifth amendment has
been held to insure that the silence of a criminal defendant may not be adversely commented upon at trial' 3 because such comment would be an impermissible penalty imposed for exercising a constitutional privilege. 14 Just
as one may not be compelled to forfeit his privilege against self-incrimination, an individual also has the right not to suffer any penalty for the assertion of a constitutional right. In order to preserve fully the value of the fifth
amendment right to silence, adverse comment upon the assertion of such a
right must not be allowed.
This "penalty doctrine," first established in Grzffm, was explained and
narrowed in Mcautha v. Cahfornz' 15 and Chafjm v. Stynchcombe.' 6 The McGautha Court ruled that the Constitution is not violated unless the compulsion of an election between constitutional rights "impairs to an appreciable
extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."' 7 Chajin recognized
that the Constitution does not forbid every government-imposed choice,' 8
and implied that the courts should consider whether the state has a legitimate interest in the challenged procedure. 19
B.

Impeachment

Prosecutors often attempt to impeach a defendant's credibility at trial
7. 444 U.S. 824 (1979).
8. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
9. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965);
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
10. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60
(1893).
11. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975);
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926). See alo Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391

(1957).
12.
13.
14.
15.

380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 614.
402 U.S. 183 (1971), vatated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).

16.
17.
18.
19.

412 U.S. 17 (1973).
402 U.S. at 213.
412 U.S. at 32.
Id. at 30-33.
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by questioning him about his pre-and post-arrest silence. In Raffel v. United
States,20 the Supreme Court allowed the impeachment of a criminal defendant based upon his silence at a previous trial. In Rafil, the defendant was
charged with violating the National Prohibition Act. 2 I At his first trial, the
defendant elected not to testify despite the testimony of a government agent
22
that the defendant had made certain admissions to him prior to arrest.
When the first trial ended in a mistrial, Raffel elected to testify at his second
trial and denied making the purported admissions. 23 On cross-examination,
he was asked why he had not testified at the first trial.
In allowing the impeachment, the Court stated that once a defendant
takes the stand, he completely waives his immunity of silence and may be
cross-examined like any other witness. 24 The narrow holding 25 of Ra el was
that a defendant's fifth amendment immunity, asserted at a previous trial,
does not survive his appearance in a second trial so as to shield his previous
silence from comment. 2 6 The Court found no justification in the underlying
from testififth amendment policies for extending the defendant's immunity
27
fying beyond the trial in which the privilege is exercised.
Nearly a half century later, the Court again addressed the issue of impeachment by reference to a defendant's post-arrest silence. In United States
v. Hale,28 the defendant was arrested and convicted of robbery. At the time
of arrest and up until trial, the defendant remained silent and refused to
explain his possession of $158. He related an exculpatory version at trial,
and his testimony was impeached by prosecutorial remarks about his pretrial
silence. 29 The Court distinguished Rafel on its facts and relied instead on its
1957 decision of G7unewaldv. United States,30 which held that it was unlawful
to cross-examine a defendant about his fifth amendment invocation at a
prior grand jury hearing. The Court in Hale reversed the conviction by exercising its supervisory power over the federal courts, holding that it was error
to permit cross-examination of the defendant concerning his silence during
police interrogation. 3 ' The Court ruled that any valid impeachment of
20.

271 U.S. 494 (1926).

21.

National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (tits. I-II repealed by Liquor Law

Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, § 1, 49 Stat. 872 (1935)).
22. 271 U.S. at 495. At the trial a prohibition officer testified that he had searched a
drinking establishment. After the search Raffel admitted to owning the establishment. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 496-97.
25. The case came to the Court upon a certified question: "Was it error to require the
defendant, Raffel, offering himself as a witness upon the second trial, to disclose that he had not
testified. . . upon the first trial[?]" Id. at 496. The Court answered in the negative. Id. at 499.
26. Id. The holding of Rajdl is questionable in light of later cases. See text accompanying
notes 68-85 ifra. Various state cases have concluded that Raffit has been impliedly overruled or
so eroded as to lack authority. See, e.g., Raithel v. State, 40 Md. App. 107, 388 A.2d 161 (1978);
State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977); McFadden v. Page, 428 P.2d 338(Okla. Crim.
App. 1967); Commonwealth v. Jones, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 236, 327 A.2d 638 (1974); Dean v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 666, 166 S.E.2d 228 (1969).
27. 271 U.S. at 498-99.
28. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
29. Id. at 174.
30. 353 U.S. 391 (1957). For a discussion of Gruwewatd, see text accompanying notes 74-78
infta.
31. 422 U.S. at 181.
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prior inconsistent statements requires that the prior statement 3 2 be inconsistent with the testimony at trial.3 3 Failure to establish the threshold inconsistency between the statements mandates that the prior silence be found
devoid of probative value and therefore excludable. 34 Silence, 35the Court
reasoned, is normally so ambiguous that it lacks probative force.
In Hale, there were so many alternative explanations 36 for the defend37
ant's silence that his silence established no inconsistency with his trial alibi.
Thus, any probative value that existed was outweighed by the possible
prejudicial impact. 38 The Court's decision rested on evidentiary grounds,
avoiding the constitutional issues. Such avoidance, however, was short-lived.
One year after Hale, the Court reached the constitutional issue of impeachment through the use of post-arrest silence in Doyle v. Ohio.39 Doyle
was arrested for selling narcotics and given his Miranda warnings. 4° At the
time of arrest and until trial, Doyle remained silent. At trial, he related an
exculpatory defense for the first time.4 ' The prosecutor asked him on crossexamination why he had not told this story to the police. 42 He was convicted by the state court, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the federal courts of appeals. 43 The Court
held that the use of post-arrest silence to impeach the testimony of a defendant who received the Miranda warnings at the time of arrest would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process. 44 The Court reasoned
that post-arrest silence is "insolubly ambiguous" because the silence may be
an exercise of the Miranda rights recently communicated. 4 5 Moreover, the
Miranda warnings are an implied assurance to the arrestee that his silence
46
will not be used against him.
Significantly, the Doyle Court noted that silence at the time of arrest
may be inherently ambiguous apart from the effect of the Miranda warnings. 4 7 While the issue of post-arrest silence apparently was settled, what
remained unresolved was the constitutional validity of impeaching a defend32. Wigmore's definition of "inconsistent statement," incorporates behavior, which includes silence. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1040, at 1050 (J.
Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970).
33. 422 U.S. at 176.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. See text accompanying notes 118-19 inifa.

37. 422 U.S. at 180.
38. Id.
39. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that a number of procedural safeguards
must be followed before the prosecution will be allowed to use statements made by a suspect
during custodial interrogation. Specifically, the Court noted that "[plrior to any questioning,

the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
41. Doyle maintained that he was buying the narcotics, not selling them. 426 U.S. at 613.

42. Id.
43. 423 U.S. 823 (1975). For a list of federal cases, see 422 U.S. at 173 n.2.

44.
45.
46.
47.

426 U.S. at 618.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 617 n.8.
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149

ant's testimony by commenting on silence maintained pnor to the time of
arrest.
IL

JNKINS v ANDERSON:

THE PROTECTION FAILS

Because the defendant inJenkins asserted violations of his fifth amendment and due process rights, the Supreme Court was forced to face the constitutional issues posed by impeachment through the use of prearrest silence.
Although the majority noted that the fifth amendment protects a defendant
against comment by the prosecution when the defendant remains silent
throughout the trial, 48 the Court relied on Rail to conclude that the use of
prearrest silence for impeachment of a criminal defendant does not violate
the fifth amendment. 49 The majority interpreted Rafl as standing for
the proposition that once a defendant elects to testify he may be impeached
with his prior silence. 50 In a footnote, the Court indicated that this is true
even when the silence stems from an invocation of the fifth amendment
privilege. 5'
The Supreme Court next confronted the argument that the prosecutor's
impeachment of Jenkins' testimony was an impermissible burden on the fifth
amendment right to silence. Relying on the rules of McGautha 52 and Chaffin 3 and the holding of Raffl,M the Court found a legitimate state interest
in such impeachment (the Court's truth-finding function) 55 and no impair56
ment of the policies underlying the privilege.
In addressing the defendant's due process claim, the majority recognized the common law rule that witnesses may be impeached by their prior
silence in situations in which an assertion naturally would have been
made. 57 The Court impliedly found that the assertion naturally should have
been made by Jenkins; its absence was inconsistent with his exculpatory testimony and, as such, probative.5 8 The Court held that Doyle was not applicable in this situation, because the due process violation in Doyle was a result
59
of governmental action which induced the defendant to remain silent.
Since Jenkins' silence took place before he was taken into custody and given
Miranda warnings, there was no governmental inducement and, therefore, no
due process violation. 6" Finding no constitutional violation, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' denial of habeas corpus. Justices Stevens and
6
Stewart concurred. '
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

447 U.S. at 235 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
447 U.S. at 235-36.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236 n.2.
402 U.S. 183 (1971). Set text accompanying notes 17-19supra.
412 U.S. 17 (1973). See text accompanying notes 17-19 upra.
Seetext accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
447 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 239.

58. Id. at 240.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Justice Stewart concurred with the majority on all points except the fifth amendment
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Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, finding violations of due process, of the privilege against self-incrimination, and of the right to testify in
one's own behalf.62 The dissenters maintained that an accused has an abso-

lute right to testify in his own behalf and a right not to incriminate himself
prior to trial. To force an individual to choose between such fundamental
guarantees would be a violation of the constitutional provision from which
those rights evolve. Thus, the impeachment evidence places an impermissible burden on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
63
the right of an accused to testify in his own behalf.
III.

THE BURDENS OF IMPEACHMENT

The Court's analysis injenkz'ns of the fifth amendment issue is incomplete. The majority's reliance upon the often-questioned Ral
decision,
while omitting any meaningful discussion of the reasons for its resurrection, 64 leaves in question the continued viability of the penalty doctrine as it
relates to the fifth amendment. A burden was imposed on the defendant
who, in effect, had to choose between providing self-incriminating evidence
to the authorities, and risking impeachment should he decide to testify at
65
trial. Nevertheless, the Court relied upon Rafel, a questionable 1926 case,
decided long before the advent of the penalty doctrine, to support its finding
that the policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination were not
appreciably impaired.
A. Proper Constructzon of Raffel
The Raffel decision was based on both evidentiary and constitutional
grounds. Having found the questioning of the defendant about his prior
silence valid for evidentiary purposes,6 the Court was forced to address the
defendant's fifth amendment claim. Noting that the safeguards against selfincrimination are only for the benefit of those who do not wish to testify in
their own behalf, the Court looked to the policy underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination and found no reason
to extend the immunity from
67
giving testimony to a testifying defendant.
The Court's retreat from Rafel began in 1943 with Johnson v. United
States.68 In that case, Johnson testified about amounts he received from a
issue. On the fifth amendment issue, Justice Stewart joined the separate opinion of Justice
Stevens. Id. at 245.
Justices Stevens and Stewart found no fifth amendment issue because the defendant was
under no official compulsion to speak. Justice Stevens' due process argument was based on his
dissent in DoYe, in which he maintained that the AMianda warnings did not contain an implied
assurance that the arrestee's silence would not be used against him. 426 U.S. at 620.
62. 447 U.S. at 245 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
63. Id. at 254.
64. In a footnote, the Court referred to the cases that seem to question Ra el: United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961); Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 477 U.S. at 237 n.4.

65. Se note 26 supra.
66. 271 U.S. at 497-99.
67. Id. at 498-99.
68. 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
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criminal syndicate from 1935 to 1937. When asked on cross-examination
about monies received in 1938, the defendant was allowed by the Court to
assert his fifth amendment privilege. Later, the prosecutor commented to
the jury upon the defendant's assertion of the privilege.
The Court began its analysis injohnson with the statement from Ral
that there is a difference between the rights of defendants who testify and
those of defendants who do not.6 9 The Johnson Court then cited Dean Wigmore's treatise on evidence 70 for the rule that an accused's voluntary testimony upon any fact is a waiver as to all other relevant facts. 7 I Thus, a
defendant who testifies has signified his waiver as to all facts "except those
72
which merely impeach his credit ..
The Court in Johnson recognized that a defendant who testifies waives
his immunity from giving testimony and that the waiver is total. Nevertheless, the Court stated that the total waiver applies only to the issues made
relevant by the defendant on direct examination and not to items used solely
for impeachment.7

3

The holding of Raffel was further restricted in Grunewald v. United
States .74 One of the defendants in Grunewald had previously refused, on the
basis of his fifth amendment privilege, to answer certain questions asked of
him by a grand jury. At trial, the same questions were asked of the defendant on cross-examination and were answered in a manner consistent with
innocence. Subsequently, the prosecutor was allowed to bring out on crossexamination that the defendant had asserted his fifth amendment privilege
as to these same questions before a grand jury.
The Court in Grunewald found that Raffil was not controlling under
these circumstances, 75 because Rafel does not apply unless the trial testimony and the prior statement are inconsistent. 7 6 The Grunewald Court held
that there was no inconsistency between the assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege before a grand jury, and exculpatory testimony at trial in response
to the same questions. 77 Deciding the case on evidentiary grounds, the
Court expressly avoided the necessity of re-examining Raffel in light ofJohnson 78 and declined to reach the constitutional issue.
In Stewart v.United States, 7 9 the Court again held that Rael did not
69. Id. at 195; Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. at 496-97.
70. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2276(2) (J.McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
71. 318 U.S. at 195.
72. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 70, § 2276(2) (emphasis added).
73. 318 U.S. at 195-96.
74. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
75. Id. at 418.
76. The inconsistency in Raffel was that the defendant remained silent at his first trial in
the face of testimony that he had made an admission of guilt. This constituted a circumstance
in which it would have been natural to reply. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 175-76; Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1; 5-6 (1961); 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1042; Schiller, On
theJursprudenceofthe FiM Amendment Right to Silence, 16 Am.CRIM. L. REV. 197, 204, 206 (1979).

77. 353 U.S. at 420-23.
78. Id. at 421. Four Justices would have overruled Rafet.
concurring).
79. 366 U.S. 1 (1961).

Id. at 426 (Black, J.,
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apply to cases where there was no inconsistency between trial testimony and
statements made before trial. Stewart was charged with murder and
pleaded the defense of insanity. He did not testify at this first two trials, but
elected to testify at his third trial. On cross-examination, Stewart was impeached for his failure to testify at the previous trials. His testimony was
characterized by the Court as gibberish, 80 consistent with his defense of insanity. Thus, there was no "testimony" to impeach and any impeachment
was, therefore, solely of the defendant's demeanor. 8 ' The Court held that
Rafel did not permit impeachment of solely demeanor evidence, and found
that there was no inconsistency between silence (at one trial) and taking the
82
stand at a subsequent trial.
The resulting view of Rafl is that impeachment based on the defendant's prior silence is allowed only when there is an underlying inconsistency
between the testimony and the prior statement. The prosecution is not permitted to impeach the defendant's testimony based on his prior silence solely
by questioning the defendant's demeanor. This view is reflected in United
States v. Hale,8 3 in which the impeachment of the defendant's testimony
based on his post-arrest silence was held invalid. The Court distinguished
Rafl, noting that the inconsistency in Rafel, the failure of the accused to
testify at his first trial in spite of uncontroverted testimony that he had made
an admission of guilt, was not present in Hale.8 4 Disposing of the case on
evidentiary grounds, the Court did not reach the constitutional issue and
again declined to re-examine Rail in light ofJohnson and Grit.85
B.

Assertion of the Privilege

86
In general, citizens have a duty to report crime to the authorities.
This obligation is not diminished simply because the witness to a crime is
himself involved in illicit activities. 87 The obligation to assist authorities,
however, is subordinate to the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination.8 Generally, the privilege must be asserted by its claimant in
a timely fashion because it is not a self-executing right. 89 Any claim of privilege must be presented to a tribunal for evaluation at the time disclosures are
sought. 9°
An exception to the requirement that the claim be expressly asserted
has developed. The assertion need not be made where it would, in itself,

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 3.
Id.at 6.
Id. at 5.
422 U.S. 171 (1975). For a discussion of Hale, see text accompanying notes 28-37supra.

84. Id. at 175. Se note 76 supra.
85. Id. at 175 n.4.
86. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980), and authorities cited therein.
87. Id. 445 U.S. at 558.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 559; Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1976); United States v.
Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 7879 (1965).
90. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. at 653-55.

1981]

THE FIFTHAMENDMENT FAILS

violate the claimant's privilege. 9 ' When some coercive factor prevents an
individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his choice to remain silent, 92 the courts will forgive the usual requirement that the claim be
presented for evaluation in favor of a claim by silence. 93
Had Jenkins reported the alleged attack upon him by Redding, he
would have supplied valuable evidence linking himself to the incident. He
would have provided the police with evidence that he was in the right place
at the right time and would have actually admitted to killing the victim.
For Jenkins to have asserted the privilege, he would have had to explain to
the authorities that he was a witness to a crime and was electing to exercise
his privilege, thus alerting the police to the crime and making himself the
prime suspect. Jenkins, then, had a right to assert the privilege and fell
within the exception to the assertion rule, which excuses him from presenting
94
his claim and allows a claim by silence.
C.

Penaly Doctrne

The fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination was
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and made applicable to the
states in Malloy v. Hogan.9 In so doing, the Court characterized the privilege
as "the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such
silence." 96 One year after Malloy, the Court in Gnfm v. Caiforma9 7 established the rule that adverse comment by a judge or prosecutor upon a criminal defendant's failure to testify violates the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Such comment is an impermissible penalty because it "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 98
The proper scope and limits of the privilege are derived from an analysis of its underlying policy justifications. 99 The fifth amendment is premised
on the assumption that our system of criminal justice is an accusatorial one,
not an inquisitorial one. 100 The privilege protects all persons from abuse by
the government of its powers of investigation, arrest, trial, and punishment. 0°1 Second, the privilege is designed to deter inhumane treatment
whereby individuals are compelled by abusive tactics to provide self-incriminating evidence.' 0 2 The privilege also reflects society's unwillingness to sub91. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
92. 445 U.S. at 560 n.6; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
93. 424 U.S. at 658 n. 11; 390 U.S. at 50.
94. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
95. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
96. Id. at 8.
97. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
98. 380 U.S. at 614.
99. The purpose of the G'nim rule is grounded upon the whole complex of values that the
privilege represents. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 414 (1966).
100. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 7-8; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55

(1964).
101. Ratner, CGonseqnces of Exerctsng the Pnvilege Against Slf-lncimination, 24 U. CHI. L.
REV. 472, 484 (1957).
102. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55; see also E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2251; Ayer, The Fth Amendment
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ject criminal suspects to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt.1 10 3 A fourth widely-noted policy underlying the privilege is that
the privilege contributes toward a fair balance between the state and the
individual by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him, and by requiring the government in
its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load.'14
Although the Raffel decision has been severely limited by subsequent
decisions,'0 5 its fifth amendment holding has never been expressly disavowed. 10 6 Nevertheless, the Raf#l Court did not consider an argument
based upon a Gifin-type (penalty) rationale. Furthermore, the Court in Raffel never addressed the fourth policy justification noted above, the requirement that the government shoulder the entire load. The majority inJenkzins
again failed to address this important policy, citing instead its discussion in
Raff#l of a defendant's right not to testify, for the proposition that no fifth
amendment right had been impermissibly burdened.1 0 7 By citing Raff#, the
Jenkins Court made the same omission as did the Court in Raffel. Thus, to
date, the Court has failed to employ the policy that the government must
shoulder the entire load in any application of the penalty doctrine.
The rules set forth by the Supreme Court regarding the penalty doctrine are rather general, allowing either a broad or a narrow view to be taken
in their application. Malloy and Grifm initiated the idea that the state violates a defendant's constitutional rights when it penalizes the defendant's
assertion of those rights.' 08 McGautha indicated that while "penalties" are
impermissible, some "burdens" on constitutional rights are lawful. 10 9 The
fact that an individual must make tough choices among constitutional rights
does not constitute a penalty imposed on those rights."10 The burden becomes a penalty only when it "impairs to an appreciable extent any of the
the court should
policies behind the rights involved."" '' Chafn implied that
12
consider the legitimacy of the challenged state action.'
An application of the above rules leads to the conclusion that impeachment of a criminal defendant's testimony based upon his prearrest silence, at
least in the circumstances of theJenkins case, violates the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. TheJenkins majority noted that the state had
at stake the important interest of ascertaining the truth.'I 3 This truth-findand the Inference of GutIfrom Silence: Griffin v. California After Fzfleen Years, 78 MIcH. L. REV.

841, 849 (1980).
103. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55; see also Ayer, supra note 102, at 84950.
104. Tehan v. Scott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at
55; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 70, § 2251, at 317. Ayer, supra note 102, at 849.
105.

See text accompanying notes 68-85 supra.

106. Hale, Stewart, and Grunewald were all decided on evidentiary grounds using the
Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the lower federal courts.
107. 447 U.S. at 235-36.
108. See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
109. 402 U.S. at 217; Schiller, supra note 76, at 213 n.96.
110. Id. at 214. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
111. Id. at 213.
112. 412 U.S. at 30-33. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
113. 447 U.S. at 238.
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ing function of the courts is significant, and it can at least be argued that
impeachment may enhance this interest." t 4 It must be remembered, however, that the privilege against self-incrimination "is not an adjunct to the
ascertainment of truth.'' t5 The fifth amendment privilege protects more
important constitutional values which reflect the concern of society that the
6
individual be left alone."1
The question remains whether the impeachment through the use of
prearrest silence impairs any fifth amendment policy. 1 7 Certainly a burden
is imposed on the defendant if he refuses to come forward at the time of the
incident. His silence, which may be motivated by fear,' 18 an unwillingness
to incriminate another, or a reliance on the right to remain silent,'19 may
later be used to impeach his trial testimony should he offer an exculpatory
version of events. Thus, an individual involved in a possibly criminal activity must decide immediately (for any amount of silence would supposedly be
suspect) whether to remain silent and risk impeachment or to forego that
right and risk almost certain self-incrimination by providing evidence to the
authorities.
Requiring an individual to make such a decision, without the assistance
of counsel, tips the balance in favor of the state in its contest with the individual.' 20 If government is to shoulder the entire load and leave the individual unmolested in the absence of independent evidence connecting him with
a crime,' 2 ' then impeachment for failing to provide the authorities with incriminating evidence appreciably impairs this fifth amendment policy.
The loss of such impeachment evidence would not overly burden the
prosecution. Impeachment evidence is, by nature, only used to assess the
defendant's credibility, and the Court has noted the probative weakness of
silence.12 2 Furthermore, the exercise of the privilege cannot be found indicative of guilt or presumptive of perjury.' 23 Since the privilege serves to protect the innocent who, like Jenkins, otherwise might be ensnared in
ambiguous circumstances, 24 there is no reason to believe that only the
114.

Id.

115. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. at 416.
116. Id.See text accompanying notes 12-19, 95-104 supra.
117. In addition, thejenkins decision may induce defendants not to take the stand because of
the impact on the jury of impeachment evidence, thus hindering the ascertainment of truth by
depriving the court of the defendant's testimony. Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the
Erclustinary Rule, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 939, 944 (1967).
118. Jenkins was a black parolee, making fear a likely explanation for his silence.
119. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 177; Ratner, supra note 101, at 492-93; Schiller,
Silence, 67 CALiF.
supra note 76, at 208-09; Note, Robeson v. State: Cross-Examination of Prearrest
L. REv. 1205, 1210-11 (1979).
120. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 70, § 2251.
121. Ratner, supra note 101, at 474.
122. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 617 n.8; United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 176-77.
Wigmore explains that "failure to assert a fact when it would have been natural to assert it,
amounts to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact." 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 32,
§ 1042, at 1056. Silence often is of little relevence because "the inference of assent may safely be
made only when no other explanation is equally consistent with silence." 4 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 32, § 1071, at 102.
123. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956).
124. Id. at 557-58. See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1

guilty will go free due to the loss of the impeachment evidence. The prosecutor may still cross-examine the defendant on all facets of his exculpatory
version as brought out on direct examination.' 25 Once the defendant testifies, he must do so completely and without immunity. But the prosecutor
must not be allowed to make remarks which infringe upon a defendant's
constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION

The impeachment of a criminal defendant's testimony due to his prearrest silence should have been found by theJenkns Court to be a fifth amendment violation. Reliance by theJenkinr majority upon Ral was misplaced
because Ra,9l applies only when there is an underlying inconsistency between the trial testimony and the prior statement and because it failed to
consider an argument based on the penalty doctrine rationale. In Jenknr,
there was no underlying inconsistency between the prearrest silence and the
exculpatory version at trial.

Furthermore, Rail failed to address the fifth amendment policy that
the government must bear the entire burden in its contest with the individual. By relying on Ral for its conclusion that no fifth amendment policy
was impaired, theJenkbus Court also failed to address that issue. By proper
application of the penalty doctrine in conjunction with the fifth amendment
policy noted above, the Court should have concluded that impeachment
based on prearrest silence appreciably impairs that policy.
The penalty doctrine established the principle that impeachment evidence is barred when such impeachment constitutes a penalty imposed upon
the prior exercise of the fifth amendment right of silence. 126 When a defendant is compelled to make an election between constitutional rights, and the
policies underlying those rights are appreciably impaired, an impermissible
penalty exists. In its haste to slam the door on any further expansion of
earlier, more liberal decisions, the Court failed to provide a sound analytical
base for its holding.
Lary Brenman

125. Note, Robeson v. State: Cross-Examnation ofPreanrest S/enee, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1205,
1209 (1979).
126. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.

